

- I'm here to render some perspectives on cyber defense & offense, based on about 40 years in the field
 - I'll keep it unclassified
- 40 years ago we were protecting mainframes. Personal computers were not quite around yet.
 - Biggest national threat was the Soviet Union stealing national level information
 - Computers were expensive and used by many
 - Rainbow series had not yet come out (TCSEC 1983).

- Late 70s/early 80s had proofs showing that testing could never find all flaws, so government funding switch to formal methods away from testing
- 1980s saw proliferation of PCs and workstations, early Ethernet and Internet.
 - C2 by 92 mantra
- 1988 was the Morris worm —
 - Big shock to the system — number of non-certified systems, speed of problem, range of sites hit

- 1989 formation of the CERT/cc (DOE CIAC was there first)
- early 1990s, focus on intrusion detection
- my early conversations with Bill Black, Brian Snow, Becky Bace, Jim Anderson and others. Bill left the agency in 1997 and returned in 2000 as deputy director.
- Need for something beyond individual systems — network centric, tactical awareness
- NTOC was created in 2004, inspired in part by the NSOC

- I was working with Air Intelligence Agency in 1990s. They developed the virtual honey net, had developed signal capture envelopes to test new items
- As I told Bill, I expected AF to be first, Navy second, and Army 3rd. (Talk about spheres of operation, 2d, 3d, EWF). Ware and Anderson reports (1967 DARPA, 1972 for AF)
- History of cavalry in the Army: 1778 to 1950 (armor)
 - The last horse-mounted cavalry charge by a U.S. Cavalry unit took place on the Bataan Peninsula, in the Philippines in early 1942. (had to eat the horses.)
 - 10th Mountain Division non-cavalry charge any Army organization while engaged in [Austria](#) in 1945.^[9] An impromptu pistol charge by the Third Platoon 14–23 April 1945.
 - Chief, the last surviving tactical horse of the United States Cavalry, died in 1968, at the age of 36.
 - 1st Cavalry Division has ceremonial 40 horses

- Space Command, then Evolution into Cybercommand
- Still not quite where it should be as individual service leaders tend to see the capability as supporting their own areas rather than as independent operations. Also, the Title 10/Title 50 conflicts throw some off.
- 20 years ago it was mostly O1s and O2s, plus warrant officers. Now seeing maturation, with talent up and down the ranks.
- Future: We perhaps need a new service? Cyber is here to stay. Also need to include psyops (consider Russian meddling)

- Some other topics....
- What is security? (History of the C-I-A model). Robert Courtney first recipient of the National Computer Systems Security Award. Died about a decade ago
 - Nothing useful can be said about the security of a mechanism except in the context of a specific application and environment.
 - Never spend more mitigating a risk than tolerating it will cost you.
 - There are management solutions to technical problems but no technical solutions to management problems.

- Donn B. Parker's Hexad (add authenticity, possession/control and utility)
- Absolute security is not achievable
 - Against hackers, probably
 - Against organized crime, probably
 - Against malware, less certain
 - Against nation state actors, more difficult
 - Against UFO invasion — what?
 - Against Extinction Level event?
 - Maybe move out to a colony on Mars, but then death of the sun will consume all the inner planets so time is a factor

- I will define it as “trust” and “awareness” — trust in people/technology, awareness of threat/technology possibilities, cost, lifespan
- We use assurance methods to gain higher levels of trust. This include formal methods and testing — neither is sufficient by itself
- Management has to understand these things! Also, speed is not conducive to getting things right

- We need to have trust in supply chain and 3rd parties
- That also means trust in data provenance
- Target attacked via HVAC systems in 2013
- Casino attacked via fish tank controls, 2016
- Android games online
- Ccleaner software
- Taiwan translation

- Supply chain is both a vulnerability and an opportunity.
- Lowest bid is not our friend, nor is unduly tight scheduling
- Thinking about long maintenance tails may give an interesting possibility for attack.

- Farewell Dossier, 1981-1982, Colonel Vladimir Vetrov
 - Handled by French intelligence
- Unit Line X
- Mitterand gave to Reagan
- trans-Siberian pipeline disaster in 1982
- Vetrov executed in 1985 after love triangle

- Kaspersky
- Phoning home with virus data. Not unusual, although most use some kind of encoding. (Symantec, Norton)
- Apparently, Israel was monitoring the traffic and saw US classified material from NSA
- Kaspersky offered open source viewing
- Now, it appears CIA was using Kaspersky's identity to hide their own exfiltration

- Design vs adhocery
- A program that has not been specified cannot be incorrect; it can only be surprising. Earl Bobert 1985
- Adding on afterwards leaves you in an uncertain state.
Patching is not securing

- Understanding the art of the possible, and how far technology can be pushed is part of awareness
- Spycraft by Robert Wallace and Keith Melton (Bob was Director of CIA's Technical Services Branch)
- Glomar Explorer, Project Azorian, 1973-1974, depth of 3 miles. Glomar Challenger for drilling
 - Soviet submarine, K-129, March of 1968
 - Equivalent of \$1.7 billion

- Enigma machine
- Venona papers, 1943-1980
 - part of a project that discovered the Cambridge 5 and Manhattan spies
 - Reuse of one-time pads, and employment of computer algorithms

Summing up

- It is worth studying the past, both to understand failures, and to get a proper perspective on time
- It is important to understand who and what we trust, and why. Then DOCUMENT it!
- Understand context
- The old “Fast, good, or cheap — pick 2” is true, and may only be just 1.
- Understand you are defining a field of endeavor, for the military and for the nation. Do what you can to make choices wisely.